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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Excluding the Proffered Evidence
Regarding Kenneth Worth’s Statements
The court abused its discretion in not acting consistently with the legal
standards applicable to it as it applied the wrong standard of law and because it
failed to consider the seven factors found in State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 220
P.3d 1055 (2009). Since “[t]he district court erred by applying the wrong standard
for admissibility of [the] evidence [it] abused its discretion.” Meister, 148 Idaho at
241, 220 P.3d at 1060.
A. The District Court Applied the Wrong Standard of Law
The court did not ask itself whether a “reasonable person could conclude from
corroborating and contradictory evidence in the record that the declarant’s
statement could be true,” as required by Meister, supra. All the court said was:
“Well, it’s a well-argued and well-presented point, and it is a close point. I didn’t see,
before, the clearly corroborating circumstances, and I don’t at this point, and I’ll
abide by the ruling; although, I acknowledge that it’s very -- it’s closer in light of the
decisions that have been cited.” T pg. 647, ln. 2-7. The court, no doubt, was
focusing on corroborating circumstances because of the second clause of I.R.E.
804(b)(3). (“A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and
offered in a criminal case is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.”) But, Meister requires a more
complete analysis than mere recitation of the rule. And, while the rule requires
1

clear indication that a statement is trustworthy, Meister requires the court find only
that a reasonable person could conclude that the declarant’s statement could be
true, a much lower standard than the one applied by the court. This alone requires
this Court to vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial.
B. There Were Sufficient Corroborating Circumstances
The corroborating circumstances clearly indicated the trustworthiness of the
statements. Mr. Worth’s possession of the stolen jewelry corroborates his admission
that he stole them from the house. If Mr. Longee had possessed the stolen jewelry
or the stolen guns, the state would argue strenuously that was proof of his
participation in the burglary. It strains credulity for the state to now argue
possession does not have the same effect regarding Mr. Worth’s involvement.
Moreover, Mr. Worth’s explanation for his possession, i.e., “that Nick [Longee]
had given him some jewelry to sell that Nick had told him came from his
grandmother,” T pg. 707, ln. 15-20, doesn’t make sense. If Mr. Worth was willing to
sell stolen property, Mr. Longee would not need to lie about where the jewelry came
from. And, Mr. Longee would not need Mr. Worth to sell the jewelry if he had
legitimately obtained it. The only logical conclusion to draw from Mr. Worth’s
possession of the stolen jewelry is that he stole it.
The prior relationship between Mr. Worth and Mr. Padilla also corroborates
Mr. Worth’s admissions that they were literally ‘partners in crime.’ It would be
unlikely for strangers to burglarize a country house together. It is far more likely
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for compadres to do so. At the same time, crime partners are less likely to inculpate
each other to law enforcement or in court, but more likely to admit the truth when
in the presence of their peers, in this case, other inmates.
In addition, as previously argued, the multiple statements by Mr. Worth
cross-corroborate each other. The fact that Mr. Padilla possessed the stolen
weapons corroborates Mr. Worth’s statements that he and Mr. Padilla stole them.
Mr. Worth’s statements are also corroborated by Mr. LeBlanc’s testimony and Mr.
Padilla’s statements about the guns and why he had to blame Mr. Longee. See T
pg. 533 - ln. 24 - pg. 535, ln. 5 (LeBlanc’s testimony); T pg. 559, ln. 20 - pg. 560, ln. 4
(Ramey testimony); T pg. 586, ln. 13-20 (Gurley testimony); T pg. 624, ln. 15-24
(Simpson testimony).1
C. The District Court Failed to Consider the Meister Factors
Finally, as is plain, the court did not consider whether the statements were
against Mr. Worth’s interests, whether Mr. Worth had made the statement multiple
times, whether a significant amount of time had passed between the incident and
the statements, whether Mr. Worth would benefit from making the statements, or
whether the psychological and physical surroundings could affect the statements, as
required by Meister. 148 Idaho at 238, 220 P.3d at 1057. Even the state admits
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The state argues, in a footnote, that this Court should not consider these
corroborating circumstances because they were not argued to the district court.
State’s Brief, pg. 10, n. 3. This argument is meritless because the court in finding
there were not sufficient corroboration must have considered the entirety of the
record to that point. All that corroborative evidence should also be considered by
this Court.
3

that “the court did not expressly, on the record, analyze each of the seven applicable
factors[.]” Respondent’s Brief, pg. 12. Moreover, it is not, as claimed by the state,
“apparent from the context of record that the court was familiar with, and applied,
applicable law as set forth in Meister.” Id. While the court was familiar with
Meister, as Mr. Longee cited the case to it, nothing indicates the court applied it.
And, there is no reason to believe it did so. The record shows that the court focused
on a single Meister factor to the exclusion of all the others. As previously argued, all
the other factors militate in favor of admissibility. Opening Brief, pgs. 9-12.
The state argues that the statements were untrustworthy because the state
“had no opportunity to cross-examine [Mr. Worth] regarding the statements.”
State’s Brief, pg. 13. But that argument is a non sequitur. The hearsay rule
requires unavailability of the declarant as a prerequisite for admission. I.R.E.
804(b)(3). The lack of opportunity to cross-examine cannot be both a requirement
for admission and a bar thereto simultaneously. Moreover, the state could have
cross-examined the witnesses who heard the statements as well as impeach the
credibility of Mr. Worth, even though he was a witness for the state. I.R.E. 607.
While the state concedes that Mr. Worth’s statements “appear to be against
his interest,” State’s Brief, pg. 16, it argues that Mr. Worth would not have thought
the statements would subject him to criminal liability since he was confessing to
other convicts. But that argument is naive. Inmates testify against one another all
the time, as illustrated by the testimony of Mr. Padilla against Mr. Longee. Mr.
Worth knew this was true because he testified against Mr. Longee at the first trial.
4

Thus, Mr. Worth knew that a confession, even to other inmates, could be used
against him at a later time by an inmate seeking a recommendation from a
prosecutor at a parole hearing or even a reduction of sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35,
and would not have made the admissions if they were not true.
Next, the state contends that Mr. Worth’s statements are not trustworthy
because sometimes he implicated Mr. Longee in the burglary and sometimes he did
not. But that only impeaches his testimony that Mr. Longee was involved. It does
nothing to impeach his testimony as to his own involvement. He has been
consistent in that regard.2
Finally, the state argues that the two or three year gap between the burglary
and the statements renders the statements unreliable. However, Mr. Worth would
not misremember his own involvement in a burglary of guns and jewelry after the
passage of such a short period of time.
As has been shown, consideration of the Meister factors demonstrates the
admissibility of the statements. The district court failed to consider the factors and
therefore failed to apply the applicable law. This was an abuse of discretion and is a
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The state argues in a footnote that Mr. Worth’s statements about Mr.
Padilla being involved in the burglary with him are not admissible because they do
not tend to subject Mr. Worth to criminal liability. State’s Brief, pg. 14, n. 5. That
is incorrect because the agreement to commit the burglary with Mr. Padilla
combined with a substantial step toward the commission of the offense made Mr.
Worth guilty of conspiracy to commit burglary and conspiracy to commit grand
theft. I.C. § 18-1701. And, if Mr. Worth gave any of the stolen guns to Mr. Padilla,
he would be guilty of aiding and abetting Mr. Padilla’s unlawful possession of a
firearm. I.C. § 18-3316.
5

reversible error by itself.
D. The State Has Not Shown the Error Is Harmless Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt
The state argues that any error in the exclusion of the evidence was harmless
because “the jury necessarily made credibility determinations in favor of the state’s
witnesses and against Longee’s.” State’s Brief, pg. 18. That, however, is no answer
because the jury’s credibility determinations were based upon the evidence before it.
The question is whether this Court can determine beyond a reasonable doubt that
the jury would have come to the same credibility determinations had it heard the
evidence that Mr. Worth admitted that he and Mr. Padilla were the ones who
committed the burglary. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979
(2010).
It cannot make that determination. This was a very close case. There was no
eyewitness to the burglary. Mr. Longee did not make any admissions. He was not
found in possession of any of the stolen items, while Mr. Worth possessed the stolen
jewelry and Mr. Padilla possessed the stolen guns. Neither Mr. Longee’s
fingerprints nor his DNA were found on any stolen items. It could be that the jury
believed Mr. Padilla, notwithstanding the defense impeachment evidence, because it
was corroborated by Mr. Worth’s testimony. Thus, if the court had admitted Mr.
Worth’s confession that he and Mr. Padilla had committed the offense, it could have
turned the course of the trial. Consequently, the state has not met its burden of
proving the objected-to error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as required
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by State v. Perry, supra.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and in the Opening Brief, this Court should
vacate the convictions and remand the cases to the district court for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of December, 2017.

/s/ Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Appellant
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